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Abstract   
This study explores how seller reputations affect auction prices, and concludes that earlier findings 
may be biased due to the misspecification of seller reputation.  This paper contributes to the literature 
by offering significant empirical evidence using Taiwanese Internet auction data.  Our study reveals 
that the influence of seller reputations on auction prices is significant, irrespective of the assumptions 
of linear and non-linear relationships with price.  However, failure to consider the non-linear setting 
of seller reputation would have led us to overestimate the impact of reputations on prices because 
marginal returns to an incremental increase in reputation declines rapidly for sellers who have more 
than 15 scores.  In addition, using quantile regression, this study finds evidence of considerable 
differences in their impact on auction prices dependent on the distribution of price levels.    
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1. Introduction   
The impressive growth of Internet auctions, such as eBay or Yahoo! Auction, is, to a large extent, 
built on sellers’ integrity.  Sellers do not deliver goods to winning bidders unless they have 
received the payments.  Therefore, Internet frauds or scams due to asymmetric information are 
not unusual these days.  Such potential flaws are similar to the ‘lemon’ problem described by 
Akerlof (1970), resulting in market failure.  So, why are bidders willing to risk such uncertainty 
when sellers might not enforce the contracts honestly?  Because they expect that it would be 
costly for sellers who have already established better reputations to cheat.  Hence, the success of 
Internet auctions rests largely on the mechanism of self-enforcement, using the seller reputation 
measured by the number of positive (or negative) scores posted by bidders, which, to some extent, 
mitigates asymmetric information and indirectly discourages cheating.   
 
A large body of empirical studies has examined how reputation can help alleviate the market 
failure problem.  Most empirical results, while focusing on the influence of seller reputations on 
auction prices, show evidence that higher seller reputations increase prices (Standifird, 2001; 
McDonald and Slawson, 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Durham et al., 2004; Dewan and Hsu, 
2004; Melnik and Alm, 2002, 2005).  As for the influence of negative scores on prices, the 
empirical results generally agree that negative scores lead to lower prices, except for Eaton (2002).  
For example, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2006) find that bidders significantly punish sellers who 
receive negative feedbacks, and that the impact of negative feedbacks is much greater than 
positive feedbacks.1   
 
The objectives of this paper are threefold.  In earlier studies, the examination of the 
relationship between auction prices and reputation was often assumed to be linear, leading to a 
very small effect on prices.2  Such an assumption is misleading if the seller reputations are 
dispersed widely (see Figure 1).  Following Livingston (2005), in contrast, this study classifies 
overall sellers into four quartiles, except for unrated sellers (see Table 5 for details).  In addition 
to using ordinary least squares (OLS) to investigate the impact of auction characteristics on 
auction prices, it is likely that the number of bids is endogenously determined by other auction 
characteristics. Therefore, this study undertakes the joint estimation using seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimation.   
 
                                                 
1 For more examples, refer to Standifird (2001), McDonald and Slawson (2002), Cabral and Hortacsu (2004), Melnik 
and Alm (2002, 2005).   
2 For example, McDonald and Slawson (2002) show that an additional score in reputation would increase the price by 
$0.04 (for a collector-quality Harley-Davidson Barbie with mean price $263.21).   
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Figure 1  Distribution of seller reputation scores 
 
This study further focuses on the differences between various auctions in different quantiles of 
auction prices.  Although there is a consensus on the importance of seller reputation on auction 
prices, the existing empirical studies only provide the ‘mean’ impact of seller reputation on prices.  
For instance, Dewan and Hsu (2004) estimate that the elasticity of seller reputation with respect to 
auction prices of ‘collectible stamp’ is 0.03 using the OLS regression, implying that a 10 percent 
increase in reputation is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in auction price.  That is, given a 
median price (=$9.50) and scores (=543), 54 additional scores will raise the auction price by only 
2.85 cents (i.e., 0.053 cents per score)!  Note that auction prices in different quantiles of our 
sample have significantly different sensitivities to the explanatory variables, for example, seller 
reputation and auction length.  Quantile regression allows us to explore the whole distribution of 
online auctions, rather than a single measure of the central tendency of the auction price 
distribution.  Consequently, this paper is able to evaluate the relative importance of explanatory 
variables at different points of auction price distribution.    
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief discussion of 
methodologies used in recent empirical studies.  Section 3 outlines the empirical models and 
Section 4 describes data sources and variables descriptions.  Section 5 presents OLS, SUR and 
quantile regression results.  Section 6 summarizes the findings and provides a conclusion.    
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2. A brief discussion of recent empirical studies  
This section reviews previous Internet auction studies according to the choices of the dependent 
variable and the corresponding methodologies used.  To conserve space, these empirical results 
are not presented in this study, but some of the results are available in Bajari and Hortacsu (2004, 
Table 1).   
 
When the dependent variable is the auction price (or winning bid, or the highest bid), most 
studies utilize the OLS regression analysis (including Standifird, 2001; Ba and Pavlou, 2002; 
Eaton, 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Durham et al., 2004; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2004; Dewan 
and Hsu, 2004; Livingston, 2005; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2006).3  In addition to studies on 
successful transactions, a number of studies, for example, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), Dewan and 
Hsu (2004), Melnik and Alm (2002, 2005), use Tobit models to study the determinants of both 
successful and unsuccessful auctions.   
 
Livingston (2005) adopts the sample selection model to avoid possible biased estimates caused 
by the constraints of the Tobit model; Lucking-Reiley et al. (2006) employ the censored-normal 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure, which is exactly like a standard Tobit regression 
except that the censoring point is different across observations.  Instead of using the winning bid, 
Houser and Wooders (2006) utilize the second-highest bid plus the shipping cost as the dependent 
variable.  They then estimate the coefficients of the system equations through generalized least 
squares (GLS) procedures.   
 
If the dependent variable is the probability of a sale, or a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1 if ended with a sale or ‘Buy It Now’ (BIN), these studies usually apply the probit or logit 
model in the estimation.  The probit model includes Dewan and Hsu (2004) and Livingston 
(2005), and the logit model Eaton (2002), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), and Durham et al. 
(2004).    
 
When the dependent variable consists of the number of bidders, numbers of bids or last-minute 
bids, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) apply poisson regression to analyze the determinants of entry 
(number of bidders).  They regress the numbers of bids or last-minute bids on the number of 
bidders and other determinants using the OLS regression.  McDonald and Slawson (2002) 
specify two dependent variables: the winning bid and the number of bids, depending on several 
auction characteristics, and estimate the system equations simultaneously using the SUR 
estimation.   
 
                                                 
3 Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) normalize their dependent variables; that is, the winning bid or number of bids divided 
by the book value.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this study is unique in examining how bidders reward seller 
reputations in different quantiles.  Thus, one of the contributions of this paper is to apply 
quantile regression to examine the influence of seller reputation on different levels of auction 
prices.   
 
3. Empirical models  
This study first explores how these auction characteristics affect prices using the conventional 
OLS regression as specified in equation (1).  For example, it is expected that higher seller 
reputations, a greater number of bids, longer duration, and BIN will increase auction prices.  The 
dependent variable is PRICE, measured by the highest winning bid in an auction.  
 
PRICEi = ikik x εαα ++0 ,  ni ,...,2,1=         (1) 
where 0α  and kα  denote the intercept term and coefficients, and  includes SCORE, 
NEGSCORE, BIDS, NEGDUMMY, OPBIDONE, BIN, SHIPPING, BONUS, , 
(
kx
jQ
jBT 4,...,2,1=j ), VOLUME and so on.  Table A.1 in Appendix describes the variables used in 
this study.  
 
However, it is likely that the number of bids is endogenously determined by other auction 
characteristics (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2006; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; McDonald and Slawson, 
2002).  Seller reputations and other characteristics, such as auction length, could affect auction 
price indirectly by influencing the number of bids.  This study establishes an additional equation 
(2) for the number of bids, and estimates the system equations (1) and (2) simultaneously using 
the SUR estimation, which allows error terms which exhibit contemporaneous correlation: 
0)()( == ii uEE ε  and 12)( σε =uE .  The dependent variable is BIDS measured by the number 
of bids.   
BIDSi = imim uz ++ ββ0 ,  ni ,...,2,1=         (2) 
where 0β  and mβ  denote the intercept term and coefficients;  includes SCORE, OPBID, 
 (
mz
jQ 4,...,2,1=j ), LENGTH , WEEKEND and so on.   
 
To analyze the impact of seller reputations on the different points of auction price distribution, 
this study carries out a more detailed investigation using quantile regression, introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978).  Quantile regression is a natural extension of classical least squares 
regression to an ensemble of models for conditional quantile functions.  For least squares 
functions, squared residual error is minimized with respect to the conditional mean.  Quantile 
regression functions are estimated by minimizing an asymmetrically weighted sum of absolute 
errors (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, 1982; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  In addition, quantile 
regression is not sensitive to dependent variable outliers and heteroscedastic errors, both of which 
significantly affect classical least squares estimation (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  
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Figure 2 shows the kernel density estimates of auction prices for 512 Mb and 1 Gb.  It 
indicates that the distributions deviate from the normal and are skewed to the right.  The 
deviation from the normal distribution is confirmed as shown in Table 1, which presents skewness 
and Kurtosis tests for normality.  Thus, the present study re-estimates the OLS model specified 
as equation (1) using quantile regression techniques.  The following conditional quantiles: 0.10 
(percentile 10 percent), 0.25 (lower quartile), 0.50 (median), 0.75 (upper quartile) and 0.90 
(percentile 90 percent) will be taken into account.  Let  be the  and  a vector of 
covariates representing auction characteristics.  The statistical model specifies the θth quantile of 
the conditional distribution of  given  as a linear function of the covariates,  
iy iPRICE ix
iy ix
iii xy εβθ += ' , , ni ,...,2,1= 10 <<θ         (3) 
As shown by Koenker and Bassett (1978, 1982), the quantile regression estimator ( θβ ) solves the 
following minimization problem 
θ̂β = ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−+− ∑∑
<∈≥∈ }|{}|{
||)1(||minarg
βββ
βθβθ
iiii xyii
ii
xyii
ii xyxy ,     (4) 
The objective function above is a weighted sum of absolute deviations, and it can be shown that 
the estimator for  is consistent and asymptotic normal.   θβ̂
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Figure 2 Kernel density estimates of prices from the least square estimator for 512 Mb and 1 
Gb  
  
Table 1 Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality  
   Joint 
Variable Pr(skewness) Pr(kurtosis) Adj  )2(2χ Pr >  )2(2χ
Price (512 Mb) 0.000 0.000 33.63 0.0000 
Price (1 Gb) 0.140 0.033 6.35 0.0417 
 
4. Data source and description   
The data used in this study is restricted to a ‘brand new’ Apple iPod shuffle 512 Mb or 1 Gb MP3 
player, which includes earphones, neck hanging strap and so on.  The data are collected by hand 
from Yahoo! Kimo auctions between 5 October, 2005 and 31 December 2005 (tw.bid.yahoo.com), 
and there were 466 iPod shuffle sales for 512 Mb and 116 sales for 1 Gb.4  Yahoo! Kimo is a 
leading online auction site in Taiwan, with more than 90 percent of the market share in transaction 
values of Internet auctions, followed by eBay and PChome.5  Figures 3 (a) and (b) show the 
histograms for prices of the iPod shuffle, 512 Mb and 1 Gb, respectively.  Most of the auctions 
for 512 Mb and 1 Gb are, respectively, finished between $NT2,500 and $3,000 and between 
$NT3,500 and $4,000.  Within each category (512 Mb and 1 Gb) why are prices so dispersed?  
                                                 
4 Our sample is restricted to successful auctions because auctions that attract no bids and automatically re-advertise 
are difficult to distinguish.  
5  In June 2006, eBay and PChome agreed to form a joint online auction site and the new auction site, 
www.Ruten.com.tw, will begin its operations in October 2006, an effort aimed at competing with market leader Yahoo! 
Kimo.   
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We argue that the dispersion is mostly due to differences in seller reputation.  
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for auction characteristic variables.  The mean price and 
shipping cost for 512 Mb (1 Gb) are $NT2,742 ($3,770) and $NT54 ($52), respectively, and the 
average numbers of bids and bidders for 512 Mb (1 Gb) turn out to be 7.2 (7.9) and 3.7 (3.6), 
respectively.  Table 3 indicates the details of the opening bid and bidding types, where BT1, BT2 
and BT4 are ended with BIN.  Bidding type BT2 has the highest average opening bid of 
$NT2,822 for 512 Mb and $NT3,872 for 1 Gb.  In addition, a relatively higher ratio of the 
opening bid at $NT1 in bidding type BT4 resulted in the lowest average opening bid of $NT1,370 
for 512 Mb and $1,507 for 1 Gb, respectively.   
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Figure 3(a)  Histogram for price of the iPod shuffle 512 Mb   
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Figure 3(b)  Histogram for price of the iPod shuffle 1 Gb 
 
Table 2 Summary statistic auction characteristics variables  
512 Mb N Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
PRICE  ($NT)  466 2742.4 230.9 2700 2000 3600 
BIDS   466 7.2 12.0 2 1 69 
BIDDERS  466 3.7 4.7 2 1 31 
OPBID  ($NT)  466 2100.4 989.3 2500 1 3600 
OPBID = $NT1 66 1 0 1 1 1 
OPBID (> $NT1) 400 2446.8 539.6 2500 60 3600 
SHIPPING  ($NT) 466 54.0 44.2 50 0 200 
VOLUME 466 6.5 2.3 7 1 11 
LENGTH  466 6.3 3.4 7 1 10 
1 Gb       
PRICE  ($NT) 116 3770.1 237.5 3750 3000 4500 
BIDS   116 7.9 15.0 1 1 78 
BIDDERS  116 3.6 5.1 1 1 30 
OPBID  116 3008.9 1375.5 3600 1 4500 
OPBID = $NT1 16 1 0 1 1 1 
OPBID (> $NT1) 100 3490.2 708.2 3600 4 4500 
SHIPPING  ($NT) 116 51.9 47.2 50 0 150 
VOLUME 116 2.4 1.2 2 1 5 
LENGTH 116 5.5 3.0 5 1 10 
 9
Table 3 Summary statistic: opening bid and bidding types   
Bidding types BT0 BT1 BT2 BT3 BT4 
512 Mb       
 mean OPBIN ($NT)  2610 2505 2822 1601 1370 
OPBID > $NT1, N = 73 60 95 136 36 
OPBID = $NT1, N = 0 1 0 49 16 
N = 73 61 95 185 52 
1 Gb      
 mean OPBIN ($NT)  3664 3547 3872 1690 1507 
OPBID > $NT1, N = 25 19 32 17 7 
OPBID = $NT1, N = 0 0 0 15 1 
N = 25 19 32 32 8 
 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for dummy variables.  In general, sellers who have no 
reputation receive the lowest mean price of $NT2,420 for 512 Mb, but unexpectedly attract the 
highest number of bids, at 12.2 on average.  Auctions starting with an opening bid of $NT1 on 
average attract 29.3 bids for 512 Mb and 40.7 bids for 1 Gb, respectively.  Auctions ending with 
BIN for 512 Mb have a higher mean price than non-BIN auctions at $NT192, and for 1 Gb at 
$156.  Surprisingly, bidding type three (BT3), which has the highest average number of bids at 
14.2, receives the lowest mean price of $NT2,654 for 512 Mb and $NT3,689 for 1 Gb.  The 
effects of weekend auctions and the length of auctions on prices differ for 512 Mb and 1 Gb. For 
instance, there is a higher average number of bids (7.8) during the weekend for 512 Mb, but a 
lower average number of bids for 1 Gb during the weekend.   
 
Table 4 Summary statistics for dummy variables: price and bids  
 512 Mb  1 Gb  
Reputation  N Mean bids Mean price N Mean bids Mean price 
Q0 (unrated)  10 12.2 2420 3 4.0 3900 
Q1 (1st quartile)  112 6.6 2701 25 3.2 3610 
Q2 (2nd quartile) 117 7.0 2747 25 5.6 3759 
Q3 (3rd quartile) 112 7.9 2763 34 10.5 3788 
Q4 (4th quartile) 115 6.9 2786 29 11.2 3883 
OPBID ($NT)       
OPBID = $NT1 66 29.3 2740 16 40.7 3725 
OPBID (> $NT1) 400 3.6 2743 100 2.7 3777 
BONUS       
1 40 7.3 2868 18 3.9 3930 
0 426 7.2 2731 98 8.6 3741 
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BIN        
1 208 3.1 2849 59 19.7 3847 
0 258 10.5 2657 57 13.8 3691 
Bidding types        
BT0 73 1.0 2664 25 1.0 3692 
BT1 61 1.0 2888 19 1.0 3814 
BT2 95 1.0 2825 32 1.0 3872 
BT3 185 14.2 2654 32 23.9 3689 
BT4 52 9.3 2847 8 9.6 3825 
MONTH       
October 144 7.4 2723 32 11.2 3717 
November 156 6.4 2750 46 9.0 3784 
December 166 7.4 2752 38 3.8 3799 
WEEKEND       
1 174 7.8 2727 46 7.4 3777 
0  292 6.8 2751 70 8.3 3766 
LENGTH        
1 day 60 2.0 2760 13 1.6 3775 
2 days 38 3.6 2758 16 1.1 3813 
3 days 30 9.5 2741 5 4.0 3750 
4 days 31 12.2 2815 12 1.3 3754 
5 days 33 5.8 2733 14 10.1 3689 
6 days 30 7.3 2786 9 5.4 3831 
7 days 48 9.9 2705 15 14.1 3779 
8 days 22 4.1 2732 9 17.8 3782 
9 days 23 7.7 2803 6 19.2 3792 
10 days 151 8.5 2715 17 10.0 3756 
EXPERIENCED        
1 153 6.8 2765 47 9.0 3779 
0 313 7.4 2732 69 7.1 3758 
NEGDUMMY       
1 103 8.4 2745 26 10.2 3774 
0  363 6.9 2742 90 7.2 3769 
Ending day#         
Monday 66 7.6 2750 15 12.9 3729 
Tuesday 59 5.9 2766 11 2.1 3870 
Wednesday 78 6.0 2757 21 5.6 3773 
Thursday 89 7.6 2738 23 10.7 3732 
 11
Friday 65 5.9 2717 19 7.2 3828 
Saturday 62 8.4 2725 10 8.4 3736 
Sunday 47 10.0 2745 17 7.0 3744 
Total 466 7.2 2742 116 7.9 3770 
Note:  #Ending day is excluded in the regression analyses due to its insignificance.   
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of seller reputation scores.  More than half of the sellers 
have less than 45 scores, and sellers who have more than 1,000 scores only account for about 3 
percent of total sellers.  Summary statistics for seller reputations are presented in Table 5.  
Notably, the seller with the highest reputation has 4,983 positive scores, and only one negative 
score, and has had as many as 5,256 transactions.  Except for those unrated sellers, this study 
classifies sellers into four quartiles.  The first quartile consists of sellers who have scores 
between 1 and 14; the second quartile between 15 and 42; but a seller needs to obtain at least 116 
scores to be grouped in the fourth quartile.  As long as there are sellers without negative scores, 
the ratio of positive scores to the sum of positive and negative scores will be 100 percent, 
irrespective of the number of positive and neutral scores.  As a result, the RATIO exceeds 99 
percent across four quartiles, due to few negative scores.   
 
Table 5 Summary statistic: seller reputations  
 Mean Std. error Median Max Min 
All observations (N = 582)      
RATIO (%) 97.2  14.8 100 100 0 
SCORE  149.6  427.2 42 4982 0 
POSCORE 150.1  428.0 42 4983 0 
NEGSCORE 0.5  1.6 0 28 0 
NEUSCORE 1.7  7.7 0 111 0 
TRANSACTION  177.4  493.0 52 5256 0 
Beginner# (N = 13)      
1st Quartile (N = 137)      
RATIO (%) 99.54 2.10 100 100 85.71 
SCORE  6.91 4.05 6 14 1 
POSCORE 6.96 4.09 6 15 1 
NEGSCORE 0.05 0.22 0 1 0 
NEUSCORE 0.07 0.28 0 2 0 
TRANSACTION  8.10 5.12 8 22 1 
2nd Quartile (N = 142)      
RATIO (%) 99.04  2.24 100 100 88.64 
SCORE  26.71  8.24 25 42 15 
 12
POSCORE 26.98  8.34 25 42 15 
NEGSCORE 0.30  0.75 0 5 0 
NEUSCORE 0.32  0.70 0 4 0 
TRANSACTION  32.47  13.27 30.5 97 15 
3rd Quartile (N = 146)      
RATIO (%) 99.45  1.38 100 100 91.07 
SCORE  74.19  21.63 72 115 43 
POSCORE 74.60  21.69 72 122 43 
NEGSCORE 0.41  1.08 0 9 0 
NEUSCORE 0.86  1.39 0 9 0 
TRANSACTION  88.75  28.86 86 182 45 
4th Quartile (N = 144)      
RATIO (%) 99.62  0.88 100 100 93.62 
SCORE  496.48  759.97 208.5 4982 116 
POSCORE 497.62  761.21 210 4983 116 
NEGSCORE 1.14  2.88 0 28 0 
NEUSCORE 5.60  14.82 2 111 0 
TRANSACTION  587.24  870.69 241.5 5256 125 
 
Note:  # indicates sellers with no scores. 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Preliminary analysis – OLS regression  
This study starts with the OLS regression and adds explanatory variables gradually in equation (1), 
as shown in Table 6.  The estimated coefficients for SIZE are between 870 and 902, and are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in Models 1–6.  This not only indicates the price 
difference between 512 Mb and 1 Gb (close to the mean price difference of $NT1,030), but also 
leads to a relatively high adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression.6  The coefficients of 
SCORE are approximately 0.07 or 0.08 and statistically significant, which is comparable to 
Dewan and Hsu (2004) and Lucking-Reiley et al. (2006).  Thus, an additional increase in scores 
translates into an increase in auction price of $NT0.08.  Four reputation dummies 
( ,jQ 4,...,2,1=j ) also exhibit positive and significant effects on auction prices; that is, a seller 
who has a reputation score between 1 and 14 (or between 15 and 42) will obtain an additional 
$NT111 (or $170) more than a seller who has no score (Model 6, Table 6).   
 
 
                                                 
6 This study also estimates the determinants of auction prices separately for 512Mb, the adjusted R2 for 512Mb, for 
example, is down to about 0.35, see Table 9 for details.   
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Next, analogous to Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Durham et al. (2004), the estimates for the 
coefficients of NEGSCORE are insignificant in all specifications and exhibit alternate signs; 
namely, it does not lower auction prices statistically.  Two alternative explanations are offered 
for the outcome.  First, our sample data are restricted to the brand new iPod shuffle so that it 
significantly reduces possible complaints from buyers.  If our sample products were second-hand, 
the impact of negative scores would be critical.  Second, many buyers in Taiwan are afraid to 
leave a negative feedback because of the real threat of retaliation from sellers.  This makes it 
difficult to evaluate the importance of negative scores on auction prices.   
 
The coefficients of BIDS, OPBID, OPBIDONE, BIN, BONUS, and LENGTH are estimated to 
be significantly positive, suggesting that, for instance, an auction lasting for a longer period of 
time will have a higher auction price on average.  This is in line with the finding of 
Lucking-Reiley et al. (2006).  The impact of SHIPPING, MONTH, and EXPERIENCED on 
auction prices are statistically insignificant.  The only factor which significantly lowers the 
auction prices in this study is the daily supply of iPod shuffles; this corresponds to a fundamental 
economic principle, that is, a large quantity supply lowers prices, other things remaining the same.   
 
Table 6 Estimates of coefficients by OLS regression  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SIZE 896.80*** 869.83*** 876.64*** 901.87*** 872.87*** 880.19*** 
 (34.69) (33.27) (33.95) (34.56) (33.15) (33.86) 
SCORE 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08***    
 (3.42) (3.62) (3.79)    
NEGSCORE 6.91 7.00 3.57 –9.78 –13.04 –19.91 
 (1.22) (1.26) (0.65) (–0.46) (–0.63) (–0.97) 
Q1     142.71** 111.98* 111.34* 
    (2.45) (1.94) (1.79) 
Q2     191.49*** 171.99*** 169.65*** 
    (3.27) (2.98) (3.00) 
Q3     208.93*** 195.49*** 195.18*** 
    (3.57) (3.39) (3.46) 
Q4     218.96*** 205.69*** 199.41*** 
    (3.69) (3.52) (3.46) 
BIDS 5.04*** 5.91*** 5.49*** 5.14*** 5.98*** 5.58*** 
 (4.27) (4.90) (4.61) (4.33) (4.95) (4.68) 
OPBID 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
 (7.30) (8.47) (7.79) (7.02) (8.44) (7.75) 
OPBIDONE 223.44*** 273.43*** 255.19*** 209.83*** 262.33*** 245.29*** 
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 (4.62) (5.54) (5.24) (4.29) (5.28) (5.01) 
BIN 186.24***   186.20***   
 (10.58)   (10.50)   
BT1  217.64*** 239.84***  211.82*** 233.76*** 
  (7.37) (8.02)  (7.15) (7.80) 
BT2  124.15*** 131.92***  123.70*** 131.49*** 
  (4.67) (4.97)  (4.60) (4.89) 
BT3  13.92 3.76  19.79 8.61 
  (0.51) (0.14)  (0.73) (0.32) 
BT4  280.89*** 282.94***  295.92*** 296.66*** 
  (7.87) (8.03)  (8.25) (8.39) 
SHIPPING   –0.23   –0.28 
   (−1.25)   (–1.51) 
BONUS   108.61***   113.47*** 
   (3.91)   (4.11) 
VOLUME   –7.81**   –6.97** 
   (−2.52)   (–2.25) 
MONTH   7.82   9.73 
   (0.78)   (0.96) 
LENGTH    8.34***   8.42*** 
   (3.05)   (3.08) 
EXPERIENCED    10.04   1.10 
   (0.58)   (0.06) 
Constant  2316.24*** 2212.67*** 2248.24*** 2153.67*** 2059.64*** 2095.06*** 
 (51.36) (39.84) (36.56) (31.81) (27.97) (27.06) 
Adjusted R2  0.8227 0.8283 0.8360 0.8220 0.8282 0.8362 
N 582 582 582 582 582 582 
 
Notes: 1. t-values are in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
3. The adjusted R2 for 512 Mb is down to about 0.35, see Table 9 for details.  
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5.2 Eliminating a possible endogenous factor – SUR estimation  
Table 7 shows the coefficients estimates of auction characteristics using the SUR estimation.  
The estimated coefficients, such as SIZE, SCORE, BIDS, OPBINONE, OPBID, BONUS and 
LENGTH, remain positive and statistically significant, and the estimates for NEGSCORE (or 
NEGDUMMY), SHIPPING, MONTH, and EXPERIENCED continue to be insignificant in the 
system equations.  The coefficient estimate of SCORE is significantly positive (0.08) in equation 
(1), but becomes smaller and negative (–0.0008) in equation (2), despite being statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level in Model 7.  Contrary to McDonald and Slawson (2002) and 
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), this study shows that a seller who has a higher reputation does not 
necessarily attract more bids, resulting in a higher auction price.  Regardless of the assumptions 
of linear and non-linear relationships with price, seller reputations do not have any positive and 
significant impact on the number of bids.  
 
The estimated coefficients of OPBID and LENGTH are negatively related to the number of bids, 
despite being counterintuitive for LENGTH.  The outcome is apparently caused by auctions 
ending on day four for 512 Mb items, which have the highest average number of bids of 12.2 (see 
Table 4).  Additionally, weekend auctions do not increase the number of bids compared to 
weekday ones.  Turning to the differentiation of the bidding process, the estimates of BT1, BT2, 
and BT4 are positive and statistically significant in both the OLS regression and SUR estimation.  
This implies that the presence of a BIN price significantly raises the prices regardless of any types 
of BIN.7  For instance, an auction ending with a BIN increases the auction prices ranging from 
$NT124 (BT2 in Model 5) and up to $297 (BT4 in Model 6).  Overall, the empirical findings of 
this study appear to be consistent and robust across all specifications (Models 1–9). 
 
Table 7 Estimates of coefficients by the SUR model estimation  
Model (7)  (8)  (9)  
PRICE Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
SIZE 875.80*** (34.44) 879.03*** (34.44) 878.87*** (34.45) 
SCORE 0.08*** (3.81)     
Q1   111.75** (2.02) 111.31** (2.01) 
Q2   169.60*** (3.05) 168.55*** (3.03) 
Q3   195.65*** (3.53) 193.46*** (3.49) 
Q4   200.23*** (3.54) 196.85*** (3.48) 
NEGSCORE 3.55 (0.65)     
NEGDUMMY    –20.98 (–1.04) –19.48 (–0.96) 
BIDS 5.84*** (4.98) 6.14*** (5.25) 6.26*** (5.35) 
                                                 
7 The theoretical explanations of a BIN’s impact on auction prices from the viewpoint of sellers have been analyzed in 
Budish and Takeyama (2001), Mathews (2004), and Reynolds and Wooders (2006).    
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OPBID 0.15*** (8.05) 0.15*** (8.10) 0.15*** (8.14) 
OPBIDONE 255.63*** (5.32) 245.43*** (5.11) 245.22*** (5.10) 
BT1 239.67*** (8.14) 233.50*** (7.94) 233.60*** (7.94) 
BT2 131.61*** (5.03) 130.87*** (4.96) 130.77*** (4.96) 
BT3 0.82 (0.03) 3.96 (0.15) 3.07 (0.12) 
BT4 280.40*** (8.08) 292.59*** (8.43) 291.81*** (8.41) 
SHIPPING –0.23 (–1.25) –0.28 (–1.52) –0.28 (–1.52) 
BONUS 108.21*** (3.96) 112.73*** (4.16) 112.68*** (4.16) 
VOLUME –7.73** (–2.53) –6.85** (–2.25) –6.84** (–2.25) 
MONTH 7.91 (0.80) 9.79 (0.99) 9.80 (0.99) 
LENGTH 8.31*** (3.08) 8.38*** (3.12) 8.36*** (3.11) 
EXPERIENCED  10.27 (0.61) 1.34 (0.08) 1.40 (0.08) 
Constant 2240.67*** (36.99) 2083.61*** (27.40) 2082.80*** (27.38) 
Adjusted R2 0.8405  0.8415  0.8414  
BIDS       
SCORE  –0.0008* (–1.75) –0.0008 (–1.63)   
NEGSCORE  0.13 (1.00) 0.13 (1.03)   
Q1      0.24 (0.19) 
Q2      0.50 (0.38) 
Q3      1.07 (0.82) 
Q4      1.39 (1.06) 
NEGDUMMY      –0.59 (–1.25) 
OPBID –0.001*** (–3.91) –0.001*** (–3.93) –0.001*** –4.42) 
BIDDERS  2.31*** (36.53) 2.31*** (36.52) 2.28*** (36.60) 
LENGTH   –0.10* (–1.65) –0.09* (–1.65) –0.09 (–1.49) 
WEEKEND  0.59 (1.54) 0.58 (1.53) 0.54 (1.39) 
Constant  1.55* (1.83) 1.56* (1.83) 1.15 (0.79) 
Adjusted R2  0.8758  0.8758  0.8764  
N 582  582  582  
Notes: 1. t-values are in parentheses.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
5.3 Testing the equality of the coefficients  
Table 8 shows the equality tests of bidding types and reputations coefficient estimates using 
F-test and -test.  Although the null hypothesis that the coefficients of BT1 and BT4 are equal 
is not rejected, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of BT1, BT2, and BT4 are equal is 
statistically rejected at the 1 percent level, implying that the impact of three different types of BIN 
on auction prices differ significantly.  In other words, our study suggests that it is indispensable 
2χ
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to differentiate the bidding process while analyzing the impact of BIN on the prices.  Next, the 
estimates for the coefficients of seller reputations ( ,jQ 4,...,2,1=j ) are positive and statistically 
significant in the SUR estimation, and their impact on auction prices are comparable to those in 
the OLS regression.  Nevertheless, marginal returns to an incremental increase in reputation 
declines rapidly when sellers have more than 15 scores because the null hypothesis of Q2 = Q3 = 
Q4 coefficients is not rejected, suggesting that the incremental effects on price level of moving 
from quartile 1 to quartile 2, from quartile 2 to quartile 3, and quartile 3 to quartile 4 are 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 8 Test of bidding types and four quartiles scores coefficients    
 OLS (3) OLS (6) SUR (7) SUR (8) SUR (9) 
Null hypothesis F p-value F p-value 2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 
BT1 = BT2  14.58 0.0001  13.04 0.0003 15.07 0.0001 13.69 0.0002 13.63 0.0002 
BT1 = BT4  1.44 0.2303  3.03 0.0823 1.33 0.2492 2.69 0.1008 2.77 0.0958 
BT2 = BT4  17.83 0.0000  20.6 0.0000 17.84 0.0000 20.33 0.0000 20.49 0.0000 
BT1 = BT2 = BT4  11.69 0.0000  12.24 0.0000 23.72 0.0000 24.65 0.0000 24.74 0.0000 
 
 OLS (6) SUR (8) SUR (9)  
Null hypothesis F p-value 2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 
Q1 coefficient = Q2 coefficient  6.20 0.0131 5.67 0.0176 6.33 0.0119 
Q1 coefficient = Q3 coefficient  12.53 0.0004 10.86 0.0001 13.01 0.0003 
Q1 coefficient = Q4 coefficient  11.87 0.0006 11.42 0.0008 12.42 0.0004 
Q2 coefficient = Q3 coefficient  1.25 0.2639 0.90 0.3433 1.35 0.2450 
Q2 coefficient = Q4 coefficient  1.57 0.2109 1.17 0.2799 1.72 0.1893 
Q3 coefficient = Q4 coefficient  0.03 0.8568 0.02 0.8866 0.04 0.8425 
Coefficients of Q1 = Q2 = Q3   6.52 0.0016 5.73 0.0034 13.52 0.0012 
Coefficients of Q2 = Q3 = Q4  0.95 0.3875 0.69 0.5002 2.07 0.3546 
Coefficients of Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = Q4 5.26 0.0014 4.85 0.0024 16.44 0.0009 
 
5.4 More insights from quantile regression  
To conserve space, the quantile regression results will only be presented for 512 Mb, as shown 
in Table 9.  There are considerable differences, including differences in sign, in their impact on 
prices with different degrees of auction prices.  At the 0.25 and 0.5 quantiles, the estimate of 
SCORE, surprisingly, turns out to be insignificant; that is, seller reputations do not affect the 
median and first quartile auction prices.  This finding cannot be observed through the 
conventional OLS regression, and the implication of this outcome is even more interesting.  That 
is, as long as the prices are relatively equal or lower than median prices, buyers are not 
particularly concerned with seller reputations.   
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While at the 0.1, 0.75, and 0.9 quantiles, SCORE is significantly associated with prices, in 
particular, at the 0.9 quantile, the estimated coefficient is 0.15, which is more than double as the 
mean coefficient estimated by the OLS regression.  The implication is that when auction prices 
are far above (or far below) the median prices, bidders are willing to buy and pay more only if 
sellers establish better reputations.  Although NEGSCORE does not have any impact on prices 
according to the OLS estimation, it seems no longer to be true in quantile regression, especially, at 
the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles, where the estimated coefficients of NEGSCORE are statistically 
significant at –3.45 and –9.10, respectively.  For prices in the tails of the distribution, bidders are 
particularly sensitive to negative scores and negative scores have a much greater effect than 
(positive) scores do.  The coefficient estimates of OPBID and OPBIDONE from the 0.1 to 0.9 
quantiles fall gradually from 0.84 to 0.14 and from 2022 to 219, respectively, implying the 
influences of the opening bid as well as an opening bid at $NT1 decrease as auction prices 
increase.   
 
Although the mean coefficient estimates of BT1, BT2 and BT4, respectively, are 265, 125, and 
300, there are wide variations in coefficient estimates in different quantiles.  For instance, the 
estimates of BT1 and BT4 increase steadily, ranging from 121 to 350 and from 181 to 354, 
respectively, but BT3 has a significant positive correlation with auction prices at the 0.1 and 0.25 
quantiles only, and its impact falls gradually.  The insignificant impact of quantity supply on 
prices at the 0.5 quantile, contrary to the OLS result, indicates a strong demand for median prices 
of the iPod shuffle.   
 
Table 9 Coefficient estimates of the quantile regression and OLS estimation for 512 Mb  
Model 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 OLS 
SCORE 0.02** 0.01 0.04 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.06** 
 (2.33) (0.47) (1.36) (3.24) (7.46) (2.43) 
NEGSCORE –3.45* 1.91 1.87 7.37 –9.10* 5.98 
 (–1.70) (0.57) (0.26) (1.64) (–1.74) (1.02) 
BIDS 1.20** 6.31*** 5.69*** 7.28*** 6.82*** 5.87*** 
 (2.22) (6.41) (3.58) (4.59) (2.99) (4.49) 
OPBID 0.84*** 0.46*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 
 (94.24) (31.95) (7.18) (5.39) (2.74) (8.65) 
OPBIDONE 2021.65*** 937.63*** 301.70*** 295.04*** 219.05* 331.32*** 
 (128.16) (32.95) (4.59) (3.74) (1.92) (6.22) 
BT1 120.52*** 163.70*** 250.82*** 271.41*** 349.72*** 264.62*** 
 (7.42) (6.66) (5.92) (6.71) (6.76) (7.80) 
BT2 18.33 78.52*** 141.06*** 142.79*** 96.22* 124.81*** 
 (1.27) (3.58) (3.76) (3.93) (1.93) (4.14) 
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BT3 68.13*** 74.86*** 52.42 16.32 –15.07 23.90 
 (4.80) (3.38) (1.43) (0.48) (–0.36) (0.82) 
BT4 180.87*** 245.17*** 317.20*** 336.00*** 354.17*** 299.86*** 
 (10.01) (8.35) (6.68) (8.14) (6.56) (7.95) 
SHIPPING –0.03 –0.17 –0.18 –0.35 –0.31 –0.24 
 (–0.39) (–1.14) (–0.70) (–1.46) (–1.07) (–1.19) 
BONUS 23.00 63.48*** 126.04*** 108.15*** 91.81** 94.70*** 
 (1.49) (2.65) (3.08) (2.82) (2.15) (2.90) 
VOLUME –3.16* –5.60** –6.87 –11.06** –3.46 –9.71** 
 (–1.81) (–2.00) (–1.44) (–2.39) (–0.62) (–2.56) 
MONTH 7.13 –3.51 2.15 –7.87 –3.83 2.66 
 (1.32) (–0.43) (0.16) (–2.93) (–0.22) (0.24) 
LENGTH  2.92** 4.60** 5.19 4.85 –2.58 7.08** 
 (2.10) (2.15) (1.41) (1.39) (–0.53) (2.41) 
EXPERIENCED  –16.53* 24.52* 23.86 –3.57 13.56 8.07 
 (–1.80) (1.73) (1.00) (–0.16) (0.48) (0.42) 
Constant  383.06*** 1395.72*** 2107.86*** 2293.59*** 2511.42*** 2141.67*** 
 (14.27) (29.61) (24.25) (23.74) (18.86) (30.65) 
Pseudo R2 0.3143 0.2120 0.2219 0.2698 0.2383 0.3482# 
N 466 466 466 466 466 466 
 
Notes: 1. t-values are in parentheses and # denotes R-square.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
6. Conclusions  
Recently, there has been a growing interest by economists in research into the determinants of the 
prices in Internet auctions.  Despite a consensus on the significant impact of seller reputations on 
auction prices, the major difference is that the influence of reputations on prices varies 
substantially, depending on price levels.  This paper contributes to the literature by offering 
significant empirical evidence using Taiwanese Internet auction data for the iPod shuffle.  In 
addition, this paper applies the OLS and SUR estimations and, in particular, quantile regression in 
order to study the influences of seller reputations and other auction characteristics on auction 
prices.    
 
Consistent with previous studies, our study reveals that the influence of seller reputations on 
auction prices is significant, irrespective of the assumptions of the linear and non-linear 
relationship with price.  Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in their impact on prices 
with different degrees of auction prices; for instance, at the 0.25 and 0.5 quantiles, seller 
 20
reputations do not have an impact on auction prices.  The similar finding of the insignificant 
impact of negative scores on prices also corresponds to some of the earlier literature.  Moreover, 
BIN, and other auction characteristics (for example, opening bid, length of auction) do 
significantly contribute to auction prices.  
    
Finally, our findings clearly emphasize the importance of incorporating a non-linear setting of 
seller reputations and applying quantile regression when analyzing the influence of seller 
reputation on auction prices.  Failure to consider the non-linear setting of seller reputation would 
have led us to overestimate the impact of reputations on prices, because marginal returns to an 
incremental increase in reputation declines rapidly for sellers who have more than 15 scores.  
Our future research aims to include unsuccessful auctions and compare auction behaviors cross 
countries (for example, Taiwan versus Japan).  
 21
Appendix  
Table A.1 Definition of variables 
Variable Description 
PRICE  the highest winning bid  
RATIO* ratio of positive scores to the sum of positive and negative scores  
SCORE  positive scores minus negative scores  
POSCORE* positive scores  
NEGSCORE negative scores  
NEUSCORE* neutral scores   
NEGDUMMY dummy variable = 1, if a seller has negative scores   
TRANSACTION*  number of all transactions, including repeat buyers   
BIDS  number of bids  
BIDDERS  number of bidders  
OPBID  opening bid set by sellers  
SHIPPING  cost for shipping and handling or $NT50 if not specified  
VOLUME  number of the iPod shuffle sold on the same day  
LENGTH  number of days that an item is sold in an auction  
Q0  dummy variable = 1, if a seller has zero score  
Q1 (1st quartile)  dummy variable = 1, if a seller has scores between 1 and 14 
Q2 (2nd quartile) dummy variable = 1, if a seller has scores between 15 and 42 
Q3 (3rd quartile) dummy variable = 1, if a seller has scores between 43 and 115  
Q4 (4th quartile) dummy variable = 1, if a seller has scores between 116 and 4982 
SIZE dummy variable = 1, if capacity is 1 Gb 
OPBIDONE   dummy variable = 1, if opening bid = $NT1 
BIN (Buy It Now)  dummy variable = 1, if auction ended with ‘Buy It Now’ 
BT0 (bidding type 0)  dummy variable = 1, if one bid until the end of an auction  
BT1 (bidding type 1) dummy variable = 1, if one bid and is ended with a BIN price  
BT2 (bidding type 2) dummy variable = 1, if one bid and opening bid equals a BIN price  
BT3 (bidding type 3) dummy variable = 1, if many bids until the end of bidding 
BT4 (bidding type 4) dummy variable = 1, if many bids and is ended with a BIN price  
BONUS  dummy variable = 1, if scratch resistant protector, and others   
WEEKEND  dummy variable = 1, if auction ended on Saturday or Sunday   
EXPERIENCED  dummy variable = 1, if sellers who sell two iPod shuffles or more  
MONTH  time dummy = 0, if auction ended in October 2005;    
= 1, if auction ended in November 2005;  
= 2, if auction ended in December 2005  
 
Note:  Variables with asterisk are not included in the regression analysis.   
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